Physical objects and their properties are sometimes observable and sometimes not, but any physical object is equally accessible, in principle, to anyone.
When I presented this argument in lecture to Searle, he replied in the following way. At some point the physical data about the snake triggers my conscious sensory perception of the snake. Various of Descartes' disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God.
By having only a one-direction interaction between a brain and its spirit mind, epiphenomenalism indeed solves half of the problem: there is no downward flow of data from spirit to brain that needs to be explained. As for the allegedly attendent problem of explaining how the causal link works, Searle has solved the problem for me with his threefold reply to Nagel.
Each of these mental experiences are ways of representing the world.
In the first place, the relationship between the micro-level and macro-level of the spark plug firing is identity, whereas the relationship between the mind and the brain is that the mind is causally dependent on the brain, but not identical with it. Goetz eds.